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Abstract. We propose an information-theoretically secure encryption scheme for classical mes-
sages with quantum ciphertexts that offers detection of eavesdropping attacks, and re-usability of
the key in case no eavesdropping took place: the entire key can be securely re-used for encrypting
new messages as long as no attack is detected. This is known to be impossible for fully classical
schemes, where there is no way to detect plain eavesdropping attacks.
This particular application of quantum techniques to cryptography was originally proposed by
Bennett, Brassard and Breidbart in 1982, even before proposing quantum-key-distribution, and a
simple candidate scheme was suggested but no rigorous security analysis was given. The idea was
picked up again in 2005, when Damg˚ard, Pedersen and Salvail suggested a new scheme for the same
task, but now with a rigorous security analysis. However, their scheme is much more demanding in
terms of quantum capabilities: it requires the users to have a quantum computer.
In contrast, and like the original scheme by Bennett et al., our new scheme requires from the
honest users merely to prepare and measure single BB84 qubits. As such, we not only show the
first provably-secure scheme that is within reach of current technology, but we also confirm Bennett
et al.’s original intuition that a scheme in the spirit of their original construction is indeed secure.
1 Introduction
Background. Classical information-theoretic encryption (like the one-time pad) and authentication
(like Carter-Wegman authentication) have the serious downside that the key can be re-used only a small
number of times, e.g. only once in case of the one-time pad for encryption or a strongly universal2
hash function for authentication. This is inherent since by simply observing the communication, an
eavesdropper Eve inevitably learns a substantial amount of information on the key. Furthermore, there
is no way for the communicating parties, Alice and Bob, to know whether Eve is present and has observed
the communication or not, so they have to assume the worst.
This situation changes radically when we move to the quantum setting and let the ciphertext (or
authentication tag) be a quantum state: then, by the fundamental properties of quantum mechanics, an
Eve that observes the communicated state inevitably changes it, and so it is potentially possible for the
receiver Bob to detect this, and, vice versa, to conclude that the key is still secure and thus can be safely
re-used in case everything looks as it is supposed to be.
This idea of key re-usability by means of a quantum ciphertext goes back to a manuscript titled
“Quantum Cryptography II: How to re-use a one-time pad safely even if P =NP” by Bennett, Brassard
and Breidbart written in 1982. However, their paper was originally not published, and the idea was put
aside after two of the authors discovered what then became known as BB84 quantum-key-distribution [2].1
Only much later in 2005, this idea was picked up again by Damg˚ard, Pedersen and Salvail in [5] (and
its full version in [6]), where they proposed a new such encryption scheme and gave a rigorous security
proof— in contrast, Bennett et al.’s original reasoning was very informal and hand-wavy.
The original scheme by Bennett et al. is simple and natural: you one-time-pad encrypt the message,
add some redundancy by encoding the ciphertext using an error correction (or detection) code, and
encode the result bit-wise into what we nowadays call BB84 qubits. The scheme by Damg˚ard et al. is
more involved; in particular, the actual quantum encoding is not done by means of single qubits, but by
means of states that form a set of mutually unbiased bases in a Hilbert space of large dimension. This
in particular means that their scheme requires a quantum computer to produce the quantum ciphertexts
and to decrypt them.
⋆ A differently formatted version of (version v2 of) this arXiv article 1610.05614 is available from the proceedings
of Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2017 (Springer-Verlag), or from eprint.iacr.org/2017/102.
⋆⋆ Member of QuSoft, the Dutch research center for quantum software (www.qusoft.org).
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ Funded by Canada’s NSERC discovery grant and NSERC discovery accelerator.
1 A freshly typeset version of the original manuscript was then published more than 30 years later in [3].
Our Results. We are interested in the question of whether one can combine the simplicity of the
originally proposed encryption scheme by Bennett et al. with a rigorous security analysis as offered by
Damg˚ard et al. for their scheme; in particular, whether there is a provably secure scheme that is within
reach of being implementable with current technology—and we answer the question in the affirmative.
We start with the somewhat simpler problem of finding an authentication scheme that allows to re-
use the key in case no attack is detected, and we show a very simple solution. In order to authenticate
a (classical) message msg, we encode a random bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n into BB84 qubits Hθ|x〉, where
θ ∈ {0, 1}n is part of the shared secret key, and we compute a tag t = MAC(k,msg‖x) of the message
concatenated with x, where MAC is a classical information-theoretic one-time message authentication
code, and its key k is the other part of the shared secret key. The qubits Hθ|x〉 and the classical tag t
are then sent along with msg, and the receiver verifies correctness of the received message in the obvious
way by measuring the qubits to obtain x and checking t.
One-time security of the scheme is obvious, and the intuition for key-recycling is as follows. Since
Eve does not know θ, she has a certain minimal amount of uncertainty in x, so that, if MAC has suitable
extractor-like properties, the tag t is (almost) random and independent of k and θ, and thus gives away
no information on k and θ. Furthermore, if Eve tries to gain information on k and θ by measuring some
qubits, she disturbs these qubits and is likely to be detected. A subtle issue is that if Eve measures only
very few qubits then she has a good chance of not being detected, while still learning a little bit on θ by
the fact that she has not been detected. However, as long as her uncertainty in θ is large enough this
should not help her (much), and the more information on θ she tries to collect this way the more likely
it is that she gets caught.
We show that the above intuition is correct. Formally, we prove that as long as the receiver Bob
accepts the authenticated message, the key-pair (k, θ) can be safely re-used, and if Bob rejects, it is good
enough to simply refresh θ. Our proof is based on techniques introduced in [19] and extensions thereof.
Extending our authentication scheme to an encryption scheme is intuitively quite easy: we simply
extract a one-time-pad key from x, using a strong extractor (with some additional properties) with a seed
that is also part of the shared secret key. Similarly to above, we can prove that as long as the receiver
Bob accepts, the key can be safely re-used, and if Bob rejects it is good enough to refresh θ.
In our scheme, the description length2 of θ is m+3λ, where m is the length of the encrypted message
msg and λ is the security parameter (so that the scheme fails with probability at most 2−λ). Thus, with
respect to the number of fresh random bits that are needed for the key refreshing, i.e. for updating the
key in case Bob rejects, our encryption scheme is comparable to the scheme by Damg˚ard et al.3 and
optimal in terms of the dependency on the message length m.
Our schemes can be made noise robust in order to deal with a (slightly) noisy quantum communication;
the generic solution proposed in [5,6] of using a quantum error correction code is not an option for us as
it would require a quantum computer for en- and decoding. Unfortunately, using straightforward error
correction techniques, like sending along the syndrome of x with respect to a suitable error correcting
code, renders our proofs invalid beyond an easy fix, though it is unclear whether the scheme actually
becomes insecure. However, we can deal with the issue by means of using error correction “without
leaking partial information”, as introduced by Dodis and Smith [8] and extended to the quantum setting
by Fehr and Schaffner [9]. Doing error correction in a more standard way, which would offer more freedom
in choosing the error correction code and allow for a larger amount of noise, remains an interesting open
problem.
Encryption with Key Recycling vs QKD. A possible objection against the idea of encryption
with key recycling is that one might just as well use QKD to produce a new key, rather than re-using
the old one. However, there are subtle advantages of using encryption with key recycling instead. For
instance, encryption with key recycling is (almost) non-interactive and requires only 1 bit of authenticated
feedback: “accept” or “reject”, that can be provided offline, i.e., after the communication of the private
message, as long as it is done before the scheme is re-used. This opens the possibility to provide the
feedback by means of a different channel, like by confirming over the phone. In contrast, for QKD, a large
amount of data needs to be authenticated online and in both directions. If no physically authenticated
channel is available, then the authenticated feedback can actually be done very easily: Alice appends
a random token to the message she communicates to Bob in encrypted form, and Bob confirms that
2 In our scheme, θ is not uniformly random in {0, 1}n but is chosen to be a code word, as such, its description
length is smaller than its physical bit length, and given by the dimension of the code.
3 Their scheme needs m + ℓ fresh random bits for key refreshing, where ℓ is a parameter in their construction,
and their scheme fails with probability approximately 2−ℓ/2.
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no attack is detected by returning the token back to Alice— in plain—and in case he detected an
attack, he sends a reject message instead.4 Furthermore, encryption with key recycling has the potential
to be more efficient than QKD in terms of communication. Even though this is not the case for our
scheme, there is certainly potential, because no sifting takes place and hence there is no need to throw
out a fraction of the quantum communication. Altogether, on a stable quantum network for instance,
encryption with key-recycling would be the preferred choice over QKD. Last but not least, given that
the re-usability of a one-time-pad-like encryption key was one of the very first proposed applications
of quantum cryptography—even before QKD—we feel that giving a satisfactory answer should be of
intellectual interest.
Related Work. Besides the work of Brassard et al. and of Damg˚ard et al., who focus on encrypting
classical messages, there is a line of work, like [13,15,11], that considers key recycling in the context of
authentication and/or encryption of quantum messages. However, common to almost all this work is that
only part of the key can be re-used if no attack is detected, or a new but shorter key can be extracted.
The only exceptions we know of are the two recent works by Garg et al. [10] and by Portmann [16],
which consider and analyze authentication schemes for quantum messages that do offer re-usability
of the entire key in case no attack is detected. However, these schemes are based on techniques (like
unitary designs) that require the honest users to perform quantum computations also when restricting
to classical messages. Actually, [16] states it as an explicit open problem to “find a prepare-and-measure
scheme to encrypt and authenticate a classical message in a quantum state, so that all of the key may
be recycled if it is successfully authenticated”. On the other hand, their schemes offer security against
superposition attacks, where the adversary may trick the sender into authenticating a superposition of
classical messages; this is something we do not consider here—as a matter of fact, it would be somewhat
unnatural for us since such superposition attacks require the sender (wittingly or unwittingly) to hold a
quantum computer, which is exactly what we want to avoid.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Concepts of Quantum Information Theory
We assume basic familiarity; we merely fix notation and terminology here.
Quantum states. The state of a quantum system with state space H is specified by a state vector
|ϕ〉 ∈ H in case of a pure state, or, more generally in case of a mixed state, by a density matrix ρ acting
on H. The set of density matrices acting on H is denoted D(H). We typically identify different quantum
systems by means of labels A,B etc., and we write ρA for the state of system A and HA for its state space,
etc. The joint state of a bipartite system AB is given by a density matrix ρAB in D(HA ⊗HB); it is then
understood that ρA and ρB are the respective reduced density matrices ρA = trB(ρAB) and ρB = trA(ρAB).
We also consider states that consist of a classical and a quantum part. Formally, ρXE ∈ D(HX ⊗HE)
is called a cq-state (for classical-quantum), if it is of the form
ρXE =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE ,
where PX : X → [0, 1] is a probability distribution, {|x〉}x∈X is a fixed orthonormal basis of HX , and
ρx
E
∈ D(HE). Throughout, we will slightly abuse notation and express this by writing ρXE ∈ D(X ⊗HE).
In the context of such a cq-state ρXE, an event Λ is specified by means of a decomposition ρXE =
P [Λ] · ρXE|Λ+P [¬Λ] · ρXE|¬Λ with P [Λ], P [¬Λ] ≥ 0 and ρXE|Λ, ρXE|¬Λ ∈ D(X ⊗HE). Associated to such
an event Λ is the indicator random variable 1Λ, i.e., the cq-state ρX1ΛE ∈ D(X ⊗{0, 1}⊗HE), defined in
the obvious way. Note that, for any cq-state ρXE and any x ∈ X , the event X = x is naturally defined
and ρXE|X=x = |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE and ρE|X=x = ρxE.
If a state ρX is purely classical, meaning that ρX =
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| and expressed as ρX ∈ D(X ),
we may refer to standard probability notation so that probabilities like P [X = x] are well understood.
Finally, we write µX for the fully mixed state µX =
1
|X |
∑
x |x〉〈x| = 1|X |IX ∈ D(X ).
4 Of course, when Bob sends back the token to confirm, Eve can easily replace it by the reject message and so
prevent Alice and Bob from finding agreement, but this is something that Eve can always achieve by “altering
the last message”, also in QKD.
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General quantum operations. Operations on quantum systems are described by CPTP maps. To
emphasize that a CPTP map Q : D(HA) → D(HA′) acts on density matrices in D(HA), we sometimes
write QA, and we say that it “acts on A”. Also, we may write QA→A′ in order to be explicit about the
range too. If Q is a CPTP map acting on A, we often abuse notation and simply write QA(ρAB) or ρQ(A)B
for
(QA ⊗ idB)(ρAB), where idB is the identity map on D(HB).
In line with our notation for cq-states, Q : D(X ⊗ HE) → D(X ′ ⊗ HE′) is used to express that Q
maps any cq-state ρXE ∈ D(X ⊗HE) to a cq-state Q(ρX′E) in D(X ′ ⊗HE′). We say that a CPTP map
Q : D(X ⊗HE)→ D(X ⊗HE′) is “controlled by X and acts on E ” if on a cq-state ρXE ∈ D(X ⊗HE) it
acts as
Q(ρXE) =
∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ Qx(ρxE)
with “conditional” CPTP maps Qx : D(HE)→ D(HE′). Note that in this case we write QXE→E′ rather
than QXE→XE′ , as it is understood that Q keeps X alive. For concreteness, we require that such a Q is
of the form Q = ∑x P|x〉〈x| ⊗ Qx where P|x〉〈x|(ρ) = |x〉〈x| ρ |x〉〈x| for any ρ ∈ D(HX).5 As such, Q is
fully specified by means of the conditional CPTP maps Qx. Finally, for any function f : X → Y, we say
that Q : D(X ⊗HE) → D(X ⊗HE′) is “controlled by f(X)” if it is controlled by X , but Qx = Qx′ for
any x, x′ ∈ X with f(x) = f(x′).
Markov-chain states. Let ρXY E ∈ D(X ⊗ Y ⊗HE) be a cq-state with two classical subsystems X
and Y . Following [7], we define ρX↔Y↔E to be the “Markov-chain state”
ρX↔Y↔E :=
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyE
with ρy
E
=
∑
x PX|Y (x|y) ρx,yE . If the state ρXY E is clear from the context we write X ↔ Y ↔ E to express
that ρXY E = ρX↔Y↔E. It is an easy exercise to verify that the Markov-chain condition X ↔ Y ↔ E holds
if and only if ρXY E = QY∅→E(ρXY ) for a CPTP map QY∅→E : D(Y)→ D(Y ⊗HE) that is controlled by
Y and acts on the “empty” system ∅, i.e., the conditional maps act as Qy
∅→E : D(C)→ D(HE).
Quantum measurements. We model a measurement of a quantum system A with outcome in X by
means of a CPTP map M : D(HA)→ D(X ) that acts as
M(ρ) =
∑
x∈X
tr(Exρ)|x〉〈x| ,
where {|x〉}x∈X is a fixed basis, and {Ex}x∈X forms a POVM, i.e., a family of positive-semidefinite
operators that add up to the identity matrix IX . A measurement M : D(Z ⊗HA) → D(Z ⊗ X ) is said
to be a “measurement of A controlled by Z” if it is controlled by Z and acts on A as a CPTP map. It is
easy to see that in this case the conditional CPTP maps Mz : D(HA) → D(X ) are measurements too,
referred to as “conditional measurements”.
Note that whenever M : D(HZ ⊗ HA) → D(X ) is an arbitrary measurement of Z and A that is
applied to a cq-state ρZA ∈ D(Z ⊗HA), we may assume that M first “produces a copy of Z”, and thus
we may assume without loss of generality that M : D(Z ⊗HA)→ D(Z ⊗ X ) is controlled by Z.
For a given n ∈ N, Mbb84ΘA→X denotes the BB84 measurement of an n-qubit system A controlled by Θ.
Formally, for every θ ∈ {0, 1}n the corresponding conditional measurement is specified by the POVM
{Hθ|x〉〈x|Hθ} with x ranging over {0, 1}n. Here, H is the Hadamard matrix, and Hθ|x〉 is a short hand
for Hθ1 |x1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hθn |xn〉 ∈ HA = (C2)⊗n, where {|0〉, |1〉} is the computational basis of the qubit
system C2.
Trace Distance. We capture the distance between two states ρ, σ ∈ D(H) in terms of their trace
distance δ(ρ, σ) := 12‖ρ− σ‖1, where ‖K‖1 := tr
(√
K†K
)
is the trace norm of an arbitrary operator K.
If the states ρA and ρA′ are clear from context, we may write δ(A,A
′) instead of δ(ρA, ρA′). Also, for
any cq-state ρXE in D(X ⊗HE), we write δ(X,UX |E) as a short hand for δ(ρXE, µX ⊗ ρE). Obviously,
δ(X,UX |E) captures how far away X is from uniformly random on X when given the quantum system E.
It is well known that the trace distance is monotone under CPTP maps, and it is easy to see that
if two cq-states ρXE, σXE ∈ D(X ⊗HE) coincide on their classical subsystems, meaning that ρX = σX ,
then δ(ρXE, σXE) decomposes into δ(ρXE, σXE) =
∑
x PX(x) δ(ρ
x
E
, σx
E
).
5 This means that the system X is actually measured (in the fixed basis {|x〉}x∈X ).
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2.2 The Guessing Probability
An important concept in the technical analysis of our scheme(s) is the following notion of guessing
probability, which is strongly related to the (conditional) min-entropy as introduced by Renner [17], but
turns out to be more convenient to work with for our purpose. Let ρXE ∈ D(X ⊗HE) be a cq-state.
Definition 1. The guessing probability of X given E is
Guess(X |E) := max
M
P [M(E)=X ] ,
where the maximum is over all measurements M : D(HE)→ D(X ) of E with outcome in X .6
Note that if Λ is an event, then Guess(X |E, Λ) is naturally defined by means of applying the above to
the “conditional state” ρXE|Λ ∈ D(X ⊗HE).
We will make use of the following elementary properties of the guessing probability. In all the state-
ments, it is understood that ρXE ∈ D(X ⊗HE), respectively ρXZE ∈ D(X ⊗ Z ⊗HE) in Property 2.
Property 1. Guess(X |Q(E)) ≤ Guess(X |E) for any CPTP map Q acting on E.
Property 2. Guess(X |ZE) =∑z PZ(z)Guess(X |E, Z=z).
Property 3. Guess(X |E, Λ) ≤ Guess(X |E)/P [Λ] for any event Λ.
Note that Property 2 implies that Guess(X |E, Λ) ≤ Guess(X |1ΛE)/P [Λ], but the statement of Property 3
is stronger since Guess(X |E) ≤ Guess(X |1ΛE).
Proof (of Property 3). It holds that7 P [Λ] · ρXE|Λ ≤ ρXE, and hence that for any measurement M on E
P [Λ] · P [M(E)=X |Λ] ≤ P [M(E)=X ] ≤ Guess(X |E) ,
which implies the claim. ⊓⊔
Property 4. There exists σE ∈ D(HE) so that
ρXE ≤ Guess(X |E) · IX ⊗ σE = Guess(X |E) · |X | · µX ⊗ σE .
Proof. The claim follows from Renner’s original definition of the conditional min-entropy as
H∞(X |E) := max
σE
max
λ
{λ | ρXE ≤ 2−λ · IX ⊗ σE}
and the identity H∞(X |E) = − logGuess(X |E), as shown in [12]. ⊓⊔
3 Enabling Tools
In this section, we introduce and discuss the main technical tools for the constructions and analyses of
our key-recycling authentication and encryption schemes.
3.1 On Guessing the Outcome of Quantum Measurements
We consider different “guessing games”, where one or two players need to guess the outcome of a quantum
measurement. The bounds are derived by means of the techniques of [19].
6 By our conventions, the probability P [M(E)=X] is to be understood as P [X ′=X] for the (purely classical)
state ρXX′ = ρXM(E) = (idX ⊗M)(ρXE) ∈ D(X ⊗ X ).
7 Here and throughout, for operators K and L, the inequality K ≤ L means that L−K is positive-semidefinite.
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Two-player guessing. Here, we consider a game where two parties, Bob and Charlie, need to simul-
taneously and without communication guess the outcome of BB84 measurements performed by Alice (on
n qubits prepared by Bob and Charlie), when given the bases that Alice chose. This is very similar to
the monogamy game introduced and studied in [19], but in the version we consider here, the sequence
of bases is not chosen from {0, 1}n but from a code C ⊂ {0, 1}n with minimal distance d. It is useful to
think of d to be much larger than log |C|, i.e., the dimension of the code in case of a linear code. The
following shows that in case of a uniformly random choice of the bases in C, Bob and Charlie cannot do
much better than to agree on a guess for the bases and to give Alice qubits in those bases.
Proposition 1. Let HA be a n-qubit system, and let HB and HC be arbitrary quantum systems. Consider
a state ρΘABC = µC ⊗ ρABC ∈ D(C ⊗HA ⊗HB ⊗HC), and let
ρΘXX′X′′ = NΘC→X′′ ◦ NΘB→X′ ◦Mbb84ΘA→X
(
ρΘABC
)
where Mbb84ΘA→X is the BB84-measurement of the system A (controlled by Θ), and NΘB→X′ and NΘC→X′′
are arbitrary (possibly different) measurements of the respective systems B and C, both controlled by Θ.
Then, it holds that
P [X ′=X ∧X ′′=X ] ≤ 1|C| +
1
2d/2
.
Proof. The proof uses the techniques from [19]. By Naimark’s theorem, we may assume without loss of
generality that the conditional measurements N θ
B→X′ and N θC→X′′ are specified by families {P θx}x and
{Qθx}x of projections. Then, defining for every θ ∈ C the projection Πθ =
∑
xH
θ|x〉〈x|Hθ ⊗P θx ⊗Qθx, we
see that
P [X ′=X ∧X ′′=X ] ≤ 1|C|
∥∥∥∥∑
θ
Πθ
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1|C|
∑
δ
max
θ
∥∥ΠθΠθ⊕δ∥∥ ,
where ‖ · ‖ refers to the standard operator norm, and the second inequality is by Lemma 2.2 in [19]. For
any θ, θ′ ∈ C, bounding Πθ and Πθ′ by
Πθ ≤ Γ θ :=
∑
x
Hθ|x〉〈x|Hθ ⊗ P θx ⊗ I
and
Πθ
′ ≤ ∆θ′ :=
∑
x
Hθ
′ |x〉〈x|Hθ′ ⊗ I⊗Qθ′x ,
it is shown in [19] (in the proof of Theorem 3.4) that
∥∥ΠθΠθ′∥∥ ≤ ∥∥Γ θ∆θ′∥∥ ≤ 1
2dH(θ,θ′)/2
≤ 1
2d/2
where the last inequality holds unless θ = θ′, from which the claim follows. ⊓⊔
Remark 1. If we restrict HB to be a n-qubit system too, and replace the (arbitrary) measurement NΘB
by a BB84 measurement Mbb84ΘB, i.e., “Bob measures correctly”, then we get
P [X ′=X ∧X ′′=X ] ≤ 1|C| +
1
2d
.
Two-player guessing with quantum side information. Now, we consider a version of the game
where Alice’s choice for the bases is not uniformly random, and, additionally, Bob and Charlie may hold
some quantum side information on Alice’s choice at the time when they can prepare the initial state (for
Alice, Bob and Charlie).
Corollary 1. Let HA be a n-qubit system, and let HB,HC and HE be arbitrary quantum systems. Con-
sider a state ρΘE ∈ D(C ⊗HE), and let
ρΘABC = QE→ABC
(
ρΘE
) ∈ D(C ⊗HA ⊗HB ⊗HC)
where QE→ABC is a CPTP map acting on E (only), and let
ρΘXX′X′′ = NΘC→X′′ ◦ NΘB→X′ ◦Mbb84ΘA→X
(
ρΘABC
)
as in Proposition 1 above. Then, it holds that
P [X ′=X ∧X ′′=X ] ≤ Guess(Θ|E) + Guess(Θ|E) · |C|
2d/2
.
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Proof. By Proposition 1, the claim holds as P [X ′ = X ∧ X ′′ = X ] ≤ 1/|C| + 1/2d/2 for the special
case where ρΘE is of the form ρΘE = µC ⊗ σE. Furthermore, by Property 4 we know that an arbitrary
ρΘE ∈ D(C ⊗HE) is bounded by
ρΘE ≤ Guess(Θ|E) · |C| · µC ⊗ σE .
Therefore, since the composed map
D(C ⊗HE)→ D({0, 1}), ρΘE 7→ ρΘABC 7→ ρXX′X′′ 7→ ρ1X=X′∧X=X′′
is still a CPTP map, it holds that for arbitrary ρΘE ∈ D(C ⊗HE)
P [X ′=X ∧X ′′=X ] ≤ Guess(Θ|E) · |C| ·
(
1
|C| +
1
2d/2
)
,
which proves the claim. ⊓⊔
Remark 2. Similarly to the remark above, the bound relaxes to
P [X ′=X ∧X ′′=X ] ≤ Guess(Θ|E) + Guess(Θ|E) · |C|
2d
,
when “Bob measure correctly”.
Single-player guessing (with quantum side information). Corollary 1 immediately gives us
control also over a slightly different game, where only one party needs to guess Alice’s measurement
outcome, but here he is not given the bases. Indeed, any strategy here gives a strategy for the above
simultaneous-guessing game, simply by “pre-measuring” B, and having Bob and Charlie each keep a
copy of the measurement outcome.
Corollary 2. Let HA be a n-qubit system, and let HB and HE be arbitrary quantum systems. Consider
a state ρΘE ∈ D(C ⊗HE) and let
ρΘAB = QE→AB
(
ρΘE
) ∈ D(C ⊗HA ⊗HB)
where QE→AB is a CPTP map acting on E, and let
ρΘXX′′ = NB→X′′ ◦Mbb84ΘA→X
(
ρΘAB
)
where NB→X′′ is an arbitrary measurement of B (with no access to Θ). Then, it holds that
P [X ′′=X ] ≤ Guess(Θ|E) + Guess(Θ|E) · |C|
2d/2
.
In other words, for the state ρΘXB =Mbb84ΘA→X(ρΘAB) we have that
Guess(X |B) ≤ Guess(Θ|E) + Guess(Θ|E) · |C|
2d/2
.
Remark 3. If we restrict the side information E to be classical then, using slightly different techniques,
we can improve the bounds from Corollary 1 and 2 to
Guess(Θ|E) + 1
2d/2
.
Whether this improved bound also holds in case of quantum side information is an open question.
3.2 Hash Functions with Message-Independence and Key-Privacy
The goal of key-recycling is to be able to re-use a cryptographic key. For this to be possible, it is
necessary—actually, not necessary but sufficient— that a key stays secure, i.e., that the primitive that
uses the key does not reveal anything on the key, or only very little. We introduce here a general notion
that captures this, i.e., that ensures that the key stays secure as long as there is enough uncertainty in
the message the primitive is applied to— in our construction(s), this uncertainty will then be derived
from the quantum part.
Consider a keyed hash function H : K × X → Y with key space K, message space X , and range Y.
We define the following properties on such a hash function.
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Definition 2. We say that H is message-independent if for a uniformly random key K in K, the dis-
tribution of the hash value Y = H(K,x) is independent of the message x ∈ X . And, we say that H is
uniform if it is message-independent and Y = H(K,x) is uniformly random on Y.
Thus, message-independence simply ensures that if the key is uniformly random and independent of the
message, then the hash of the message is independent of the message too. The key-privacy property
below on the other hand ensures that for any adversary that has arbitrary but limited information on
the message and the hash value—but no direct information on the key—has (almost) no information
on the key.
Definition 3. We say that H offers ν-key-privacy if for any state ρKXY E in D(K ⊗ X ⊗ Y ⊗HE) with
the properties that ρKX = µK ⊗ ρX , Y = H(K,X) and K ↔ XY ↔ E, it holds that
δ(K,UK|Y E) ≤ ν
2
√
Guess(X |Y E) · |Y| .
We say that H offers ideal key-privacy if it offers 1-key-privacy.
Remark 4. Note that if H is message-independent then for X,Y and E as above in Definition 3, we have
that Guess(X |Y E) = Guess(X |E).
Not so surprisingly, the joint notion of uniformity and key-privacy is closely related to that of a
strong extractor [14]. Indeed, if H is uniform and offers key-privacy then it is a strong extractor: for
ρKXE = µK ⊗ ρXE and Y = H(K,X), the condition on ρKXY E in Definition 3 is satisfied, and thus we
have the promised bound on δ(ρKY E, µK ⊗ ρY E) = δ(ρKY E, µK ⊗ µY ⊗ ρE), where the equality is due to
uniformity. As such, [18] shows that the required bound on δ(K,UK|Y E) is the best one can hope for.
On the other hand, the following shows that from every strong extractor we can easily construct a hash
function that offers uniformity and key-privacy.
Proposition 2. Let Ext : K×X → Y be a strong extractor, i.e., for ρKXE = µK ⊗ ρXE ∈ D(K ⊗ X ⊗HE)
and for Y computed as Y = Ext(K,X) it holds that δ(ρKY E, µK ⊗ ρY E) ≤ ν2
√
Guess(X |E) · |Y|. Further-
more, we assume that the range Y forms a group. Then, the keyed hash function8
H : (K × Y)×X → Y, (k‖k′, x) 7→ Ext(k, x) + k′
with key space K × Y satisfies uniformity and ν-key-privacy.
Proof. Uniformity is clear. For key-privacy, consider a state ρKXY E with the properties as in Definition 3.
We fix an arbitrary y ∈ Y and condition on Y = y. Conditioning on X = x as well for an arbitrary x ∈ X ,
the key (K,K ′) is uniformly distributed subject to H(K,x) + K ′ = y. In other words, K is uniformly
random in K, and K ′ = y − H(K,x). Therefore, making use of the Markov-chain property, conditioning
on Y = y only, K is uniformly random in K and independent of X and E, and K ′ = y−H(K,X). Thus,
by the extractor property, δ(ρK′KE|Y=y, µY ⊗ µK ⊗ ρE|Y=y) ≤ ν2
√
Guess(X |E, Y =y) · |Y|. The claim
follows by averaging over y, and applying Jensen’s inequality and Property 2. ⊓⊔
The following technical result will be useful.
Lemma 1. Let H : K × X → Y be a keyed hash function that satisfies message-independence. Further-
more, let ρKXY E be a state with the properties as in Definition 3. Then
Guess(X |KY E) ≤ Guess(X |Y E) · |Y| .
Proof. Note that the Markov-chain property K ↔ XY ↔ E can be understood in that E is obtained by
acting on XY only: E = Q(XY ). For the purpose of the argument, we extend the state ρXKY E to a state
ρXKK′Y Y ′EE′ as follows. We choose a uniformly random and independent K
′ in K, and set Y ′ = H(K ′, X)
and E′ = Q(XY ′). Note that ρXKY E coincides with ρXK′Y ′E′ . Therefore,
Guess(X |Y E) = Guess(X |Y ′E′) = Guess(X |KY ′E′) ,
where the second equality is by the independence of K. Furthermore, by Property 3, we have that
Guess(X |KY ′E′) ≥ P [Y =Y ′] Guess(X |KY ′E′, Y =Y ′)
8 Here, and similarly in other occasions, k‖k′ is simply a synonym for the element (k, k′) in the Cartesian product
of, here, K and Y, and is mainly used to smoothen notation and avoid expressions like
(
(k, k′), x
)
.
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= P [Y =Y ′] Guess(X |KY E, Y =Y ′) .
Finally, by the message-independence of H, it holds that Y ′ is independent of KXY E (and with the same
distribution as Y ), and therefore P [Y = Y ′] ≥ 1/|Y| and Guess(X |KY E, Y = Y ′) = Guess(X |KY E).
Altogether, this gives us the bound Guess(X |KY E) ≤ Guess(X |Y E) · |Y|, which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
Equipped with Lemma 1, we can now show the following composition results.
Proposition 3 (Parallel Composition). Consider two keyed hash functions H1 : K1 × X → Y1 and
H2 : K2 ×X → Y2 with the same message space X , and
H : (K1 ×K2)×X → Y1 × Y2, (k1‖k2, x) 7→
(
H1(k1, x),H2(k2, x)
)
with key space K = K1 × K2 and range Y = Y1 × Y2. If H1 and H2 are both message-independent (or
uniform) and respectively offer ν1-and ν2-key privacy, then H is message-independent (or uniform) and
offers (ν1 + ν2)-key privacy.
Proof. That message-independence/uniformity is preserved is clear. To argue key-privacy, assume that
we have ρK1K2X = ρK1 ⊗ ρK2 ⊗ ρX , Y1 = H1(K1, X) and Y2 = H(K2, X), and K1K2 ↔ XY1Y2 ↔ E. We
need to bound the distance of K1K2 from uniform when given Y1Y1E, which we can decompose into
δ(K1K2, UK1UK2 |Y1Y1E) ≤ δ(K1, UK1 |Y1Y2E) + δ(K2, UK2 |K1Y1Y2E) .
The above conditions on ρK1K2XY1Y2E imply that K1 ↔ XY1 ↔ K2Y2E holds, and thus also K1 ↔
XY1 ↔ Y2E. Indeed, K1K2 ↔ XY1Y2 ↔ E implies that also K1 ↔ XY1K2Y2 ↔ E, which together with
K1 ↔ XY1 ↔ K2Y2 (which holds by choice of K2 and Y2) implies that K1 ↔ XY1 ↔ K2Y2E. Therefore,
by the key-privacy property of H1, setting E1 = Y2E, we see that
δ(K1, UK1 |Y1Y2E) ≤
ν1
2
√
Guess(X |Y1Y2E) · |Y1| .
Similarly, K2 ↔ XY2 ↔ K1Y1E, and so by the key-privacy property of H2, setting E2 = K1Y1E, we
conclude that
δ(K2, UK2|K1Y1Y2E) ≤
ν2
2
√
Guess(X |Y2K1Y1E) · |Y2|
≤ ν2
2
√
Guess(X |Y2Y1E) · |Y1| · |Y2| ,
which proves the claim. ⊓⊔
Proposition 4 (“Sequarallel” Composition). Consider two keyed hash functions H1 : K1×X → Y1
and H2 : K2 × (X ⊗ Y1)→ Y2 with message spaces as specified, and
H : (K1 ×K2)×X → Y1 × Y2 , (k1‖k2, x) 7→
(
H1(k1, x),H2(k2, x‖H1(k1, x))
)
with key space K = K1 × K2 and range Y = Y1 × Y2. If H1 and H2 are both message-independent (or
uniform) and respectively offer ν1-and ν2-key privacy, then H is message-independent (or uniform) and
offers (ν1 + ν2)-key privacy.
Proof. The proof goes along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 3, except that in the reasoning
for the bound on δ(K2, UK2 |K1Y1E), we append Y1 to X , with the consequence that we get a bound that
is in terms of Guess(XY1|Y2Y1E), but this obviously coincides with Guess(X |Y2Y1E), and thus we end
up with the same bound. ⊓⊔
4 Message Authentication with Key-Recycling
We first consider the problem of message authentication with key-recycling. It turns out that—at least
with our approach—this is the actual challenging problem, and extending to (authenticated) encryption
is then quite easy.
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4.1 The Semantics
We quickly specify the semantics of a quantum authentication code (or scheme) with key-recycling.9
Definition 4. A quantum authentication code (with key recycling) QMAC with message space MSG
and key space KEY is made up of the following components: (1) A CPTP map Auth that is controlled by
a message msg ∈ MSG and a key key ∈ KEY, and that acts on an empty system and outputs a quantum
authentication tag (with a fixed state space), (2) a measurement Verify that is controlled by msg ∈MSG
and key ∈ KEY, and that acts on a quantum authentication tag and outputs a decision bit d ∈ {0, 1},
and (3) a randomized function Refresh : KEY → KEY.
We will often identify an authentication code, formalized as above, with the obvious authenticated-
message-transmission protocol πQMAC(msg), where Alice and Bob start with a shared key key ∈ KEY ,
and Alice sends the message msg along with its quantum authentication tag prepared by means of Auth
to Bob over a channel that is controlled by the adversary Eve, and, upon reception of the (possibly
modified) message and tag, Bob verifies correctness using Verify and accordingly accepts or rejects. If he
rejects, then Alice and Bob replace key by key′ := Refresh(key).10 Note that, for any messagemsg ∈MSG
and any strategy for Eve on how to interfere with the communication, the protocol πQMAC(msg) induces
a CPTP map Exe[πQMAC(msg)] : D(KEY ⊗ HE) → D(KEY ⊗ HE′) that describes the evolution of the
shared key key and Eve’s local system as a result of the execution of πQMAC(msg).
Our goal will be to show that, for our construction given below, and for any behavior of Eve, the
CPTP map Exe[πQMAC(msg)] maps a key about which Eve has little information into a (possibly updated)
key about which Eve still has little information—what it means here to “have little information” needs
to be specified, but it will in particular imply that it still allows Bob to detect a modification of the
message. This then ensures re-usability of the quantum authentication code—with the same key as long
as Bob accepts the incoming messages, and with the updated key in case he rejects.
4.2 The Scheme
Let MSG be an arbitrary non-empty finite set. We are going to construct a quantum message authen-
tication code QMAC with message space MSG. To this end, let MAC : K × (MSG × {0, 1}n) → T
be a classical one-time message authentication code with a message space MSG × {0, 1}n for some
n ∈ N. We require MAC to be secure in the standard sense, meaning a modified message will be de-
tected except with small probability εMAC. Additionally, we requireMAC to satisfy message-independence
and ideal key-privacy, as discussed in Sect. 3.2. Actually, it is sufficient if MAC( · ,msg‖ · ), i.e., the
hash function K × {0, 1}n → T , (k, x) 7→ MAC(k,msg‖x) obtained by fixing msg, satisfies message-
independence and ideal key-privacy for any msg ∈ MSG. Assuming that MSG consists of bit strings
of fixed size so that MSG × {0, 1}n = {0, 1}N for some N ∈ N, the canonical message authentica-
tion codes MAC :
(
F
ℓ×N
2 × Fℓ2
) × FN2 → Fℓ2, (A‖b, x) 7→ Ax + b and MAC : (F2N × Fℓ2) × F2N → Fℓ2,
(a‖b, x) 7→ trunc(a ·x)+ b, where trunc : F2N → Fℓ2 is an arbitrary surjective F2-linear map, are suitable
choices; this follows directly from Proposition 2. Finally, let C ⊂ {0, 1}n be a code with large minimal
distance d.
Then, our quantum message authentication code QMAC has a key space KEY = K × C, where for
a key k‖θ ∈ K × C we refer to k as the “MAC key” and to θ as the “basis key”, and QMAC works as
described in Figure 1
QMAC.Auth(k‖θ,msg): Choose a uniformly random x ∈ {0, 1}n and output n qubits B◦ in state H
θ|x〉 and
the classical tag t = MAC(k,msg‖x).
QMAC.Verify(k‖θ,msg, t): Measure the qubits B◦ in bases θ to obtain x
′ (supposed to be x), check that
t = MAC(k,msg‖x′), and output 0 or 1 accordingly.
QMAC.Refresh(k‖θ): Choose a uniformly random θ′ ∈ C and output k‖θ′.
Fig. 1. The quantum message authentication code MAC.
9 Our definition is tailored to our goal that the key can be re-used unchanged in case the message is accepted by
the recipient, Bob, and only needs to be refreshed in case he rejects. In the literature, key-recycling sometimes
comes with two refresh procedures, one for the case Bob rejects and one for the case he accepts.
10 Obviously, this requires Alice and Bob to exchange fresh randomness, i.e., the randomness for executing Refresh,
in a reliable and private way; how this is done is not relevant here.
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It is clear that as long as the MAC key k is “secure enough”, the classical MAC takes care of an Eve
that tries to modify the message msg, and it ensures that such an attack is detected by Bob, except with
small probability. What is non-trivial to argue is that the MAC key (together with the basis key) indeed
stays “secure enough” over multiple executions of πQMAC(msg); this is what we show below.
4.3 Analysis
We consider an execution of the authenticated-message-transmission protocol πQMAC(msg) for a fixed
message msg. Let ρKΘE ∈ D(K⊗C ⊗HE) be the joint state before the execution, consisting of the MAC
key K, the basis key Θ, and Eve’s local quantum system E. The joint state Exe[πQMAC(msg)](ρKΘE) after
the execution is given by ρKΘ′TDC ∈ D(K ⊗ C ⊗ T ⊗ {0, 1} ⊗HC), where Θ′ is the (possibly) updated
basis key, T is the classical tag, D is Bob’s decision to accept or reject, and C is Eve’s new quantum
system. Eve’s complete information after the execution of the scheme is thus given by E′ = TDC.
Recall that TDC is obtained as follows from KΘE. Alice prepares BB84-qubits B◦ for uniformly
random bits X and with bases determined by Θ, and she computes the tag T := MAC(K,msg‖X).
Then, Eve acts on B◦E (in a way that may depend on T ) and keeps one part, C, of the resulting state,
and Bob measures the other part, B, to obtain X ′ and checks with the (possibly modified) tag T to
decide on D.
Note that by a standard reasoning, we can think of the BB84 qubits B◦ not as being prepared by
first choosing the classical bits X and then “encoding” them into qubits with the prescribed bases Θ,
but by first preparing n EPR pairs Φ+
AB◦
and then measuring the qubits in A in the prescribed bases to
obtain X , i.e., ρKΘXB◦E =Mbb84ΘA→X
(
Φ+
AB◦
⊗ ρKΘE
)
.
The following captures the main security property of the scheme.
Theorem 1. If the state before the execution of πQMAC(msg) is of the form ρKΘE = µK ⊗ ρΘE, then for
any Eve the state ρKΘ′E′ = Exe[πQMAC(msg)](ρKΘE) after the execution satisfies
Guess(Θ′|E′) ≤ Guess(Θ|E) + 1|C|
and
δ(K,UK|Θ′E′) ≤ 2εMAC +
√
2
2
√
Guess(Θ|E)
(
1 +
|C|
2d/2
)
|T | .
This means that if before the execution of πQMAC(msg), it holds that Eve’s guessing probability on Θ is
small and K looks perfectly random to her (even when given Θ), then after the execution, Eve’s guessing
probability on (the possibly refreshed) Θ′ is still small and K still looks almost perfectly random to her.
As such, we may then consider a hypothetical refreshing ofK that has almost no impact, but which brings
us back to the position to apply Theorem 1 again, and hence allows us to re-apply this “preservation of
security” for the next execution, and so on. This in particular allows us to conclude that in an arbitrary
sequence of executions, the MAC key K stays almost perfectly random for Eve, and thus any tampering
with an authenticated message will be detected by Bob except with small probability by the security of
MAC (see Sect. 4.4 for more details).
Remark 5. For simplicity, in Theorem 1 and in the remainder of this work, we assume the messagemsg to
be arbitrary but fixed. However, it is not hard to see that we may also allow msg to be obtained by means
of a measurement, applied to Eve’s system E before the execution of πQMAC(msg), i.e., Eve can choose
it. The bounds of Theorem 1 then hold on average over the measured msg. This follows directly from
Property 2 for the bound the the guessing probability, and from a similar decomposition property for
the trace distance, together with Jensen’s inequality for the bound on the trace distance. We emphasize
however, that we do assume msg, even when provided by Eve, to be classical, i.e., we do not consider
so-called superposition attacks.
The formal proof of Theorem 1 is given below; the intuition is as follows. For the bound on the
guessing probability of the (possibly updated) basis key, we have that in case Bob rejects and so the
basis key is re-sampled from C, Eve has obviously guessing probability 1/|C|. In case Bob accepts, the fact
that Bob accepts may increase Eve’s guessing probability. For instance, Eve may measure one qubit in,
say, the computational basis, and forward the correspondingly collapsed qubit to Bob; if Bob then accepts
it is more likely that this qubit had been prepared in the computational basis by Alice, giving Eve some
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(new) information on the basis key. However, the resulting increase in guessing probability is inverse
proportional to the probability that Bob actually accepts, so that this advantage is “canceled out” by the
possibility that Bob will not accept. For the bound on the “freshness” of K (given the basis key Θ′), by
key privacy it is sufficient to argue that Eve has small guessing probability for X . In case Bob rejects, the
(refreshed) basis key is useless to her for guessingX , and so the task of guessingX reduces to winning the
game considered in Corollary 2. Similarly, the case where Bob accepts fits into the game in Corollary 1.
In both cases, we get that the guessing probability of X essentially coincides with Guess(Θ|E).
Proof. For the first claim, we simply observe that
Guess(Θ′|TDC) =
1∑
d=0
PD(d)Guess(Θ
′|TC, D=d) (by Property 2)
= PD(0)
1
|C| + PD(1)Guess(Θ|TC, D=1)
≤ PD(0) 1|C| +Guess(Θ|TC) (by Property 3)
≤ 1|C| +Guess(Θ|TB◦E) (by Property 1)
=
1
|C| +Guess(Θ|B◦E) (by Definition 2)
=
1
|C| +Guess(Θ|E) .
where the second equality holds because Θ′ is freshly chosen in case Bob rejects and Θ′ = Θ in case he
accepts, and the final equality holds because of the fact that ρB◦ΘE = trX ◦ Mbb84ΘA→X
(
Φ+
AB◦
⊗ ρΘE
)
=
trA
(
Φ+
AB◦
)⊗ ρΘE = µB◦ ⊗ ρΘE.
For the second claim, consider D˜ and Θ˜′ as follows. D˜ is 1 if X = X ′ and Eve has not modified the tag
T nor the message msg, and D˜ is 0 otherwise (i.e., D˜ is an “ideal version” of Bob’s decision), and Θ˜′ is
freshly chosen if and only D˜ = 0. The states ofKΘ′TDC andKΘ˜′T D˜C are identical except for when D =
1 but X 6= X ′ or Eve has modified T ormsg, which happens with probability at most εMAC by the security
ofMAC, and thus the two states are εMAC-close. Therefore, δ(K,UK|Θ′TDC) ≤ δ(K,UK|Θ˜′T D˜C)+2εMAC,
and so it suffices to analyze the state of KΘ˜′T D˜C. Furthermore, we may assume that Eve’s state C
contains the information of whether she modified T or msg, so that D˜ can be computed from 1X=X′
when given C, and thus δ(K,UK|Θ˜′D˜TC) ≤ δ(K,UK|Θ˜′ 1X=X′D˜TC) = δ(K,UK|Θ˜′ 1X=X′TC).
Now, since K is random and independent of XΘB◦E, T is computed as T = MAC(K,msg|X), and
Θ˜ 1X=X′C is obtained by acting on T and XΘB◦E only (and not on K), we see that the conditions
required in Definition 3 are satisfied. Therefore, by the key-privacy of MAC, and recalling Remark 4,
δ(K,UK|T Θ˜′ 1X=X′C) ≤ 1
2
√
Guess(X |Θ˜′ 1X=X′C) |T | .
Furthermore, by Property 2, and noting that Θ˜′ is freshly chosen whenever X 6=X ′, and, depending on C,
freshly chosen or equal to Θ otherwise,
Guess(X |Θ˜′ 1X=X′C) = P [X 6=X ′] Guess(X |Θ˜′C, X 6=X ′) + P [X=X ′] Guess(X |Θ˜′C, X=X ′)
≤ P [X 6=X ′] Guess(X |C, X 6=X ′) + P [X=X ′] Guess(X |ΘC, X=X ′) .
For the first term, we see that
P [X 6=X ′] Guess(X |C, X 6=X ′) ≤ Guess(X |C) (by Property 3)
≤ Guess(X |TB◦E) (by Property 1)
≤ Guess(X |B◦E) (by Definition 2)
≤ Guess(Θ|E)(1 + |C|
2d/2
)
,
where the final inequality follows from Corollary 2 by recalling that ρΘXB◦E = Mbb84ΘA→X
(
Φ+
AB◦
⊗ ρΘE
)
.
Similarly, writing X ′′ for the measurement outcome when measuring C using an optimal measurement
NΘC (controlled by Θ), we obtain
P [X=X ′] Guess(X |ΘC, X=X ′) ≤ P [X=X ′]P [X=X ′′|X=X ′]
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≤ P [X=X ′ ∧X=X ′′]
≤ Guess(Θ|E)(1 + |C|
2d/2
)
,
where the final inequality follows from Corollary 1 by observing that, using uniformity of MAC (Defini-
tion 2) in the second equality,
ρΘXXX′′ = NΘC→X′′ ◦Mbb84ΘB→X′ ◦ QTB◦E→BC
(
ρΘXTB◦E
)
= NΘC→X′′ ◦Mbb84ΘB→X ◦ QTB◦E→BC
(
ρΘXB◦E ⊗ ρT
)
= NΘC→X′′ ◦Mbb84ΘB→X′ ◦ QTB◦E→BC ◦Mbb84ΘA→X
(
Φ+
AB◦
⊗ ρΘE ⊗ ρT
)
= NΘC→X′′ ◦Mbb84ΘB→X′ ◦Mbb84ΘA→X ◦ QTB◦E→BC
(
Φ+
AB◦
⊗ ρΘE ⊗ ρT
)
= NΘC→X′′ ◦Mbb84ΘB→X′ ◦Mbb84ΘA→X ◦ Q′E→ABC
(
ρΘE
)
where Q′
E→ABC is the CPTP map Q′E→ABC(σE) = QTB◦E→BC(Φ+AB◦ ⊗ σE⊗ ρT ). Collecting the terms gives
the claimed bound. ⊓⊔
4.4 Re-usability of QMAC
We formally argue here that Theorem 1, which analyses a single usage of QMAC, implies re-usability.
The reason why this is not completely trivial is that after one execution of πQMAC, the MAC key K is
not perfectly secure anymore but “only” almost-perfectly secure, so that Theorem 1 cannot be directly
applied anymore for a second execution. However, taking care of this is quite straightforward.
Formally, we have the following result regarding the re-usability of QMAC.
Proposition 5. If Alice and Bob start off with a uniformly random key, then for a sequence πQMAC(msg1),
πQMAC(msg2), . . . of sequential executions of protocol πQMAC, and for any strategy for Eve and any i ∈ N,
the probability εi that Eve modifies msgi in the execution of πQMAC(msgi) yet Bob accepts is bounded by
εi ≤ (2i− 1) · εMAC +
√
2
2
∑
j<i
√
j
|C|
(
1 +
|C|
2d/2
)
|T | .
Proof. In case i = 1, the statement reduces to εi ≤ εMAC, which holds by construction of QMAC. To
argue the general case, let ρK1Θ1E1 , ρK2Θ2E2 , . . . describe the evolution of the MAC key and the basis
key and Eve’s information on them, given that we start with a perfect key ρK0Θ0E0 = µK ⊗ µC ⊗ ρE0 .
Formally, ρKiΘiEi is inductively defined as ρKiΘiEi = Exe[πQMAC(msgi)](ρKi−1Θi−1Ei−1). For the sake of
the argument, we also consider ρ˜K1Θ1E1 , ρ˜K2Θ2E2 , . . . obtained by means of setting ρ˜K0Θ0E0 = ρK0Θ0E0
and ρ˜KiΘiEi = Exe[πQMAC(msgi)](µK ⊗ ρ˜Θi−1Ei−1), i.e., the evolution of the keys and Eve’s information
in a hypothetical setting where the MAC key is refreshed before every new execution. For these latter
states ρ˜KiΘiEi , we can inductively apply Theorem 1 and conclude that
Guess(Θi|Ei) ≤ i+ 1|C|
and
δ(ρ˜KiΘiEi , µK ⊗ ρ˜ΘiEi) ≤ δi := 2εMAC +
√
2
2
√
i
|C|
(
1 +
|C|
2d/2
)
|T |
for any i ∈ N. But now, for the original states ρK1Θ1E1 , ρK2Θ2E2 , . . ., from the triangle inequality we
obtain that
δ(ρKiΘiEi , µK ⊗ ρ˜ΘiEi) ≤ δ(ρKiΘiEi , ρ˜KiΘiEi) + δ(ρ˜KiΘiEi , µK ⊗ ρ˜ΘiEi)
≤ δ(ρKi−1Θi−1Ei−1 , µK ⊗ ρ˜Θi−1Ei−1) + δi
≤
∑
j≤i
δj ,
where the last inequality is by induction (where the base case i = 0 is trivially satisfied). It now follows
by basic properties of the trace distance that we have εi+1 ≤ εMAC +
∑
j≤i δj . This proves the claim. ⊓⊔
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4.5 Choosing the Parameters
Let λ ∈ N be the security parameter. Consider a MAC with εMAC = 2−λ and |T | = 2λ. This can for
instance be achieved with the constructions suggested in Sect. 4.2. Also, consider a code C with |C| = 23λ
and d = 6λ, so that |C|/2d/2 = 1. The description of the basis key θ thus requires 3λ bits, and, by
Singleton bound, it is necessary that n ≥ 9λ− 1. Then, the bound in Proposition 5 becomes
εi+1 ≤ (2i+ 1) · 2−λ +
∑
j≤i
√
2
2
√
j
23λ
(
1 +
23λ
23λ
)
2λ =
(
2i+ 1 +
∑
j≤i
√
j
)
2−λ .
Hence, the error probability increases at most as
(
i
√
i+ 2i+ 1
)
2−λ with the number i of executions.
4.6 Impersonation Attacks
The above analysis considers a substitution attack, where first Alice is activated and is given a message
msg (possibly produced by Eve) and she computes and sends the quantum authentication tag, and then
Bob decides to accept or reject depending on the received (and possibly modified) tag. It is quite clear
that our results carry over to an impersonation attack, where Alice is inactive and Eve tries to get a
message accepted by Bob. Indeed, in this case, Bob will reject almost with certainty and k remains close
to uniformly random (while θ needs to be refreshed).
However, a subtle issue in this context is the following.11 Assume that after such an impersonation
attack, Bob uses the key k (which is still ensured to be secure) in another application, which may leak
information on k to Eve (like as one-time-pad encryption key on a message that is partly known to Eve).
If Alice, who may be unaware of what has been going on, now gets activated on a message msg that Eve
chose dependent on the information she just got on k (and possibly by performing a measurement on her
quantum state) and computes and sends a quantum authentication tag for msg using the key pair (θ, k),
then this may potentially leak additional information on k to Eve (which could then allow Eve to learn
more information on the one-time-pad encrypted message). Indeed, this kind of attack is not covered by
our analysis because our proof assumed msg to be independent of k.
An easy way to overcome this issue is to enforce MAC to be of the form MAC(A||b,m) = Am + b,
where A is a random (possibly Toeplitz-like) matrix; this was anyway our suggestion for MAC. Then, we
can write the tag t as
t = MAC(A||b,msg||x) = A
[
msg
x
]
+ b = A
[
msg
0
]
+ A
[
0
x
]
+ b ,
and since x is proven to have high min-entropy (and is independent of A, unlike msg), this acts as a
strong extractor and thus A
[
0
x
]
is close to uniformly random, given k = A||b and the BB84 qubits B◦
and Eve’s quantum state before she has done the measurement to obtain msg, and thus also t is close
to uniformly random, given k and the BB84 qubits and the Eve’s quantum state after she has done the
measurement. As such, the quantum authentication tag does not leak any (additional) information on k
to Eve in the above kind of attack.
5 Extensions and Variations
We show how to modify our scheme QMAC as to offer encryption as well, i.e., to produce an authenticated
encryption of msg, and how to deal with noise in the quantum communication; we start with the latter
since this is more cumbersome. At the end of the section, we show how to tweak our schemes so as to be
able to authenticate and/or encrypt quantum messages as well, and we discuss some variations.
5.1 Dealing with Noise
In order to deal with noise in the quantum communication, we introduce the following primitive. We
consider a keyed hash function SS : L × {0, 1}n → S that has the property that given the key ℓ, the
secure sketch s = SS(ℓ, x) of the message x, and a “noisy version” x′ of x, i.e., such that dH(x, x
′) ≤ ϕ ·n
for some given noise parameter ϕ < 12 , the original message x can be recovered except with probability
11 This issue was pointed out to us by Christopher Portmann.
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εSS. Additionally, we want SS to satisfy the message-independence and ideal key-privacy properties from
Definitions 2 and 3. Such constructions exist for small enough ϕ > 0, as discussed in Appendix B, based
on techniques by Dodis and Smith [8].
Then, the key for our noise-tolerant quantum message authentication code QMAC∗ consists of a
(initially) uniformly random MAC key k ∈ K for MAC, an (initially) uniformly random secure-sketch key
ℓ ∈ L for SS, and an (initially) random and independent basis key θ, chosen from the code C ⊂ {0, 1}n,
and the scheme works as described in Figure 2.
QMAC∗.Auth(k‖ℓ‖θ,msg): Choose a uniformly random x ∈ {0, 1}n and output n qubits B◦ in state H
θ|x〉
together with the secure sketch s = SS(ℓ, x) and the tag t = MAC(k,msg‖x‖s).
QMAC∗.Verify(k‖ℓ‖θ,msg, t): Measure the qubits B◦ in bases θ to obtain x
′, recover (what is supposed to be)
x using the secure sketch s, and check the tag t. If this check fails or dH(x, x
′) > ϕ ·n then output 0, else 1.
QMAC∗.Refresh(k‖ℓ‖θ): Choose uniformly random θ′ ∈ C and output k‖ℓ‖θ′.
Fig. 2. The noise-tolerant quantum message authentication code MAC∗.
Theorem 2. If the state before the execution of πQMAC∗(msg) is of the form ρKΘE = µK⊗ ρΘE, then for
any Eve the state ρKΘ′E′ = Exe[πQMAC∗(msg)](ρKΘE) after the execution satisfies
Guess(Θ′|E′) ≤ Guess(Θ|E) + 1|C|
and
δ(KL,UK×L|Θ′E′) ≤ 2(εMAC + εSS) +
√
Guess(Θ|E)
(
2+
|C|
2d/2
+
|C| · 2h(ϕ)n
2d
)
|T ||S| .
Proof. The proof of the first statement, i.e., the bound on Guess(Θ′|E′) is exactly like in the proof
of Theorem 1, with the only exception that in the one expression where the tag T appears (i.e. in the
expression obtained by using Property 1), now S appears as well (along with T ); but like T , it disappears
again in the next step due to message-independence.
For the bound on δ(KL,UK×L|Θ′E′) we follow closely the proof of Theorem 1 but with the following
modifications.
1. The key K is replaced by the key pair (K,L), and the tag T by the tag-secure-sketch pair (T, S),
and we observe that we can understand (T, S) to be the hash of the input X under key (K,L) with
respect to a hash function that satisfies message-independent and (almost) key-privacy. Indeed, this
composed hash function can be understood as being obtained by means of Proposition 4. As such,
whenever we argue by means of message-independence (Definition 2) or key-privacy (Definition 3) in
the proof of Theorem 1, we can still do so, except that we need to adjust the bound on the uniformity
of the key to the new—and now composite—hash function.
2. The auxiliary random variable D˜, and correspondingly Θ˜′, is defined in a slightly different way: D˜
is 1 if X ≈ϕ X ′ and Eve has not modified the tag T , the secure-sketch S, nor the message msg. The
“real” state with D and Θ′ is then (εMAC + εSS)-close to the modified one with D˜ and Θ˜
′ instead.
Correspondingly, the decomposition of the distance to be bounded is then done with respect to the
indicated random variable 1X≈ϕX′ instead of 1X=X′ .
3. When bounding the probability P [X ≈ϕX ′ ∧ X=X ′′], we refer to the game analyzed in Corollary 3
in Appendix A, which applies to the situation here where some slack is given for Bob’s guess.
The claimed bound is then obtained by adjusting terms according to the above changes: update the
bounds obtained by applying Definition 3 to the updated bound
√
Guess(X | · · · ) |T | |S|, obtained by
means of Proposition 4, and inserting the 2h(ϕ)n blow-up when using Corollary 3 instead of Corollary 1,
but making use of the observation in Remark 6. ⊓⊔
In essence, compared to the case with no noise, we have an additional loss due to the |S| term,
whereas we can neglect the term with 2h(ϕ)n for small enough ϕ. To compensate for this additional loss,
15
we need to have ς = log |S| additional bits of entropy in Θ, i.e., we need to choose C with |C| = 23λ+ς
and d = 6λ+ 2ς . By Singleton bound, this requires n ≥ 9λ+ 3ς − 1, and thus puts a bound ς < n/3 on
the size of the secure sketch, and thus limits the noise parameter ϕ.12
5.2 Adding Encryption
Adding encryption now works pretty straightforwardly. Concretely, our quantum encryption scheme
with key recycling QENC∗ is obtained by means of the following modifications to QMAC∗. Alice and
Bob extract additional randomness from x using an extractor that offers message-independence and key-
privacy, and use the extracted randomness as one-time-pad key to en-/decryptmsg. Finally, the resulting
ciphertext c is authenticated along with x and s; this is in order to offer authenticity as well and can be
omitted if privacy is the only concern.
Security can be proven along the same lines as Theorem 1, respectively Theorem 2 for the noise-
tolerant version, and Proposition 5: we simply observe by means of Proposition 3 and 4 that the compo-
sition of computing the triple c, s and t = MAC(k, x‖c‖s) from x constitutes a keyed hash function that
offers message-independence and key-privacy, and then we can argue exactly as above to show that the
(possibly refreshed) key stays secure over many executions. Also, given that the key is secure before an
execution, we can control the min-entropy in X as in the proof of Theorem 2 and argue almost-perfect
security of the extracted one-time-pad key, implying privacy of the communicated message.
In order to accommodate for the additional entropy that is necessary to extract this one-time-pad
key, which is reflected in the adjusted range of the composed keyed hash function, we now have to choose
C with |C| = 23λ+ς+m and d = 6λ+ 2ς + 2m, where m = log |MSG|; this requires n ≥ 9λ+ 3ς + 3m− 1
by Singleton bound.
5.3 Optimality of the Key Recycling
Our aim was, like in [5,6], to minimize the number of fresh random bits needed for the key refreshing.
In our constructions, where the key is refreshed simply by choosing a new basis key θ, this number is
obviously given by the number of bits needed to represent θ, i.e., in the above encryption scheme QENC∗,
it is
log |C| = 3λ+ ς +m .
This is close to optimal for large messages and assuming almost no noise, so that m ≫ λ, ς . Indeed,
assuming that Eve knows the encrypted message, i.e., we consider a known-plaintext attack, it is not
hard to see that for any scheme that offers (almost) perfect privacy of the message, by simply keep-
ing everything that is communicated from Alice to Bob, in particular by keeping all qubits that Alice
communicates (which will most likely trigger Bob to reject), Eve can always learn (almost) m bits of
Shannon information on the key. As such, it is obviously necessary that the key is updated with (almost)
m fresh bits of randomness in case Bob rejects, since otherwise Eve will soon have accumulated too much
information on the key.
Note that [5,6] offers a rigorously proven bound (of roughly m) on the number of fresh bits necessary
for key refreshing. However, their notion of key refreshing is stronger than what we require: they require
that the refreshed key is close to random and independent of Eve, whereas we merely require that the
refreshed key is “secure enough” as to ensure security of the primitive, i.e., authenticity in QMAC or
QMAC∗, and privacy (and authenticity) in QENC∗. Indeed, in our construction we do not require that
the basis key is close to random, only that it is hard to guess. However, the above informal argument
shows that the bound still applies.
Similarly, one can argue that in any message authentication scheme with error probability 2−λ, by
keeping everything Eve can obtain λ bits of information on the key. Thus, in case of almost no noise, our
scheme QMAC∗ is optimal up to the factor 3.
In our constructions, the number of fresh random bits needed for the key refreshing increases with
larger noise. In particular in QMAC∗, ς will soon be the dominating term in case we increase the noise
level. We point out that it is not clear whether such a dependency is necessary, as we briefly mention in
Sect. 6.
12 We recall that, when using a δ-biased family of codes to construct the secure sketch SS, as discussed in the
Appendix B, then ς does not correspond exactly to the size of the syndrome given by the code, but is determined
by the parameter δ, and is actually somewhat larger than the size of the syndrome.
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5.4 Supporting Quantum Messages
The approach in Sect. 5.2 of extracting a (one-time pad) key also gives us the means to authenticate
and/or encrypt quantum messages: we simply use the extracted key as quantum-one-time-pad key [1],
or as key for a quantum message authentication code [4]. However, when considering arbitrary quantum
messages, honest users anyway need a quantum computer, so one might just as well use the scheme by
Damg˚ard et al. to communicate a secret key and use this key for a quantum-one-time-pad or for quan-
tum message authentication, or resort to [10,16], which additionally offer security against superposition
attacks.
5.5 Variations
We briefly mention a few simple variations of our schemes. The first variation is as follows. In QMAC,
instead of choosing x uniformly at random and computing the tag t as t = MAC(k,msg‖x), we can
consider a fixed tag t◦ ∈ T , and choose x uniformly at random subject to MAC(k,msg‖x) = t◦. Since t◦
is fixed, it does not have to be sent along. In case the classical MAC, as a keyed hash function, is of the
form as in Proposition 2, meaning that the tag is one-time-pad encrypted (which in particular holds for
the canonical examples suggested in Sect. 4.2), then Theorem 1 and Proposition 5 still hold. Indeed, if
MAC is of this form then the concrete choice of t◦ is irrelevant for security: if Theorem 1 would fail for
one particular choice of t◦ then it would fail for any choice, and thus also for a randomly chosen tag,
which would then contradict Theorem 1 for the original QMAC. Similarly, in QMAC∗ and QENC∗ we
can fix the tag t and the secure sketch s (and ciphertext c), and choose x subject to the corresponding
restrictions.
A second variation is to choose the basis key θ not as a code word, but uniformly random from
{0, 1}n. As a consequence, the bounds on the games analyzed in Sect. 3.1 change— indeed, the game
analyzed in Proposition 1 then becomes the monogamy-of-entanglement game considered and analyzed
in [19]—and therefore we get different bounds in Theorem 1, but conceptually everything should still
work out. Our goal was to minimize the number of fresh random bits needed for the key refreshing, which
corresponds to the number of bits necessary to describe θ; this allows us to compare our work with [5,6]
and show that our encryption scheme performs (almost) as good as theirs in this respect. And with this
goal in mind, it makes sense to choose θ as a codeword: it gives the same guessing probability for x but
asks for less entropy in θ. Choosing θ uniformly random from {0, 1}n seems to be the preferred choice
for minimizing the quantum communication instead, which would be a very valid objective too.
As an interesting side remark, we observe that with the above variations, our constructions can
be understood as following the design principle of the scheme originally proposed by Bennett et al. of
encrypting and adding redundancy to the message, and encoding the result into BB84 qubits.
Finally, a last variation we mention is to use the six-state encoding instead of the BB84 encoding.
Since the three bases of the six-state encoding have the same so-called maximal overlap, the bounds in
Sect. 3.1 carry over unchanged, but we get more freedom in choosing the code C in {0, 1, 2}n so that
fewer qubits need to be communicated for the same amount of entropy in x. Also, when choosing the
bases uniformly at random in {0, 1, 2}n, as in the variation above, we get a slightly larger entropy for x
when using the six-state encoding.
6 Conclusion, and Open Problems
We reconsider one of the very first problems that was posed in the context of quantum cryptography,
even before QKD, and we give the first solution that offers a rigorous security proof and does not require
any sophisticated quantum computing capabilities from the honest users. However, our solution is not
the end of the story yet. An intriguing open problem is whether it is possible to do the error correction
in a more straightforward way, by just sending the syndrome of x with respect to a fixed suitable code,
rather than relying on the techniques from [8]. In return, the scheme would be simpler, it could take care
of more noise—Dodis and Smith are not explicit about the amount of noise their codes can correct but
it appears to be rather low—and, potentially, the number of fresh random bits needed for key refreshing
might not grow with the amount of noise. Annoyingly, it looks like our scheme should still be secure when
doing the error correction in the straightforward way, but our proof technique does not work anymore,
and there seems to be no direct fix.
From a practical perspective, it would be interesting to see to what extent it is possible to optimize
the quantum communication rather than the key refreshing, e.g., by using BB84 qubits with fully random
and independent bases, and whether is it possible to beat QKD in terms of quantum communication.
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APPENDIX
A Yet Another (Version of the) Guessing Game
We consider a variant of the guessing game from Section 3.1 where Bob and Charlie need to guess Alice’s
measurement outcome. In the variation considered here, we give some slack to Bob in that it is good
enough if his guess is close enough (in Hamming distance) to Alice’s measurement outcome, and Charlie
is given some (deterministic) classical side information on Alice’s measurement outcome before he has to
announce his guess.13 We show that, if the minimal distance d of the code C is large enough, this does
not help Bob and Charlie significantly. This is in line with the intuition that, for large enough d, the
optimal strategy for Bob and Charlie is to pre-guess Alice’s choice of bases.
13 Taking care of such side information, given to Charlie, on Alice’s measurement outcome is not needed for our
application, but we get it almost for free.
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Proposition 6. Let HA be a n-qubit system, and let HB and HC be arbitrary quantum systems. Also,
let 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 12 be a parameter and f : {0, 1}n → Y a function. Consider a state ρΘABC = µC ⊗ ρABC ∈D(C ⊗HA ⊗HB ⊗HC), and let
ρΘXX′X′′ = NΘf(X)C→X′′ ◦ NΘB→X′ ◦Mbb84ΘA→X
(
ρΘABC
)
where NΘB→X′ is an arbitrary measurement of system B controlled by Θ, and NΘf(X)C→X′′ is an arbitrary
measurement of system C controlled by Θ and f(X).
Then, it holds that
P [X ′≈ϕX ∧X ′′=X ] ≤ 1|C| +
2h(ϕ)n · |Y|
2d/2
,
where h is the binary entropy function.
Proof. Here, we can write
P [X ′≈ϕX ∧X ′′=X ] = 1|C|
∥∥∥∥∑
θ
Π˜θ
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1|C|
∑
δ
max
θ
∥∥Π˜θΠ˜θ⊕δ∥∥
for projectors
Π˜θ =
∑
x
Hθ|x〉〈x|Hθ ⊗
( ∑
e∈Bnϕ
P θx⊕e
)
⊗Qθ,f(x)x ,
where Bnϕ ⊂ {0, 1}n denotes the set of stings with Hamming weight at most ϕn. For any θ 6= θ′ ∈ C, we
can upper bound Π˜θ and Π˜θ
′
by
Π˜θ ≤ Γ˜ θ :=
∑
x
Hθ|x〉〈x|Hθ ⊗
( ∑
e∈Bnϕ
P θx⊕e
)
⊗ I =
∑
e∈Bnϕ
Γ θe
and
Π˜θ
′ ≤ ∆˜θ′ :=
∑
x
Hθ
′ |x〉〈x|Hθ′ ⊗ I⊗
(∑
y∈Y
Qθ
′,y
x
)
=
∑
y∈Y
∆θ
′
y
respectively, where Γ θe and ∆
θ′
y are like Γ
θ and ∆θ
′
, as defined in the proof of Proposition 1, for certain
concrete choices of the POVM’s {P θx}x and {Qθ
′
x }x that depend on e and y, respectively. As such, we
get that ∥∥Π˜θΠ˜θ′∥∥ ≤ ∥∥Γ˜ θ∆˜θ′∥∥ ≤∑
e,y
∥∥Γ θe∆θ′y ∥∥ ≤ |Bnϕ| · |Y|2d/2 ≤ 2
h(ϕ)n · |Y|
2d/2
.
Since we still have that
∥∥Π˜θΠ˜θ∥∥ = ∥∥Π˜θ∥∥ = 1, the claim follows. ⊓⊔
By means of the techniques from Section 3.1, we can extend the result to the case where Bob and
Charlie have a-priori quantum side information on Alice’s choice of bases.
Corollary 3. Let HA be a n-qubit system, and let HB,HC and HE be arbitrary quantum systems. Also,
let 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 12 be a parameter and f : {0, 1}n → Y a function. Consider a state ρΘE ∈ D(C ⊗HE), and
let
ρΘABC = QE→ABC
(
ρΘE
) ∈ D(C ⊗HA ⊗HB ⊗HC)
where QE→ABC is a CPTP map acting on E, and let
ρΘXX′X′′ = NΘf(X)C→X′′ ◦ NΘB→X′ ◦Mbb84ΘA→X
(
ρΘABC
)
as in Proposition 6 above. Then, it holds that
P [X ′≈ϕX ∧X ′′=X ] ≤ Guess(Θ|E) + Guess(Θ|E) · |C| · 2
h(ϕ)n · |Y|
2d/2
.
Remark 6. In line with the remarks in Section 3.1, if Bob “measures correctly” but is still given some
slack, and, say, Charlie is given no side information on Alice’s outcome, the bound relaxes to
P [X ′≈ϕX ∧X ′′=X ] ≤ Guess(Θ|E) + Guess(Θ|E) · |C| · 2
h(ϕ)n
2d
.
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B On the Existence of Suitable Secure Sketches
In [8, Lemma 5], Dodis and Smith show that for any constant 0 < λ < 1, there exists an explicitly
constructible family of binary linear codes {Ci}i∈I in {0, 1}n with dimension k that efficiently correct a
constant fraction of errors and have square bias δ2 ≤ 2−λn. Their Lemma 4 then shows that the keyed
hash function Ext : I×{0, 1}n → SYN = {0, 1}n−k, (i, x) 7→ syni(x) is a strong extractor, where syni(x)
is the syndrome with respect to the code Ci. More precisely, the generalization of their result to quantum
side information by Fehr and Schaffner [9] shows that if ρIXE = µI ⊗ ρXE ∈ D(I ⊗ X ⊗HE) then
δ(ρExt(I,X)IE, µSYN ⊗ ρI ⊗ ρE) ≤ 1
2
√
Guess(X |E) δ2 2n .
It follows from Proposition 2 that the secure sketch
SS : L× {0, 1}n → SYN , (i‖b, x) 7→ syni(x) + b
where L := I × SYN , offers uniformity and ν-key-privacy with parameter ν = δ2n/2/√|SYN | = δ2k.
Dodis and Smith are not explicit about the size n−k of the syndrome in their construction, but looking
at the details, we see that n−k ≤ log(δ2 2n). As such, by artificially extending the range SYN = {0, 1}n−k
of SS to a set S = {0, 1}ς of bit strings of size ς := log(δ2 2n), and re-defining SS to map (i‖b, x) to
syni(x) + b padded with sufficiently many 0’s, we get that the secure sketch SS : L × {0, 1}n → S is
message-independent and offers ideal key-privacy.14
14 Alternatively, we could simply stick to SS : L × {0, 1}n → SYN but carry along the non-ideal parameter ν;
however, we feel that this additional parameter would make things more cumbersome—but of course would
lead to the same end result.
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